Supported Databases

DBBat ships with five independent listeners — one per wire protocol family. Enable only the engines you need by setting the matching DBB_LISTEN_* variable; an empty value disables that proxy.

Engine	Protocol	Default proxy port	Env var	Status
PostgreSQL	PostgreSQL wire (pgx/v5)	:5433	DBB_LISTEN_PG	First-class. Auth terminated at the proxy. MD5 and SCRAM clients work transparently.
Oracle	TNS / TTC	:1522	DBB_LISTEN_ORA	Hand-rolled TTC parser. End-to-end with go-ora; other clients reach AUTH but cannot yet execute queries (see notes below).
MySQL	MySQL wire (go-mysql-org/go-mysql)	:3307	DBB_LISTEN_MYSQL	caching_sha2_password (default), mysql_clear_password. TLS terminated at the proxy. mysql_native_password not supported.
MariaDB	MySQL wire (same listener)	:3307	DBB_LISTEN_MYSQL	Shares the MySQL listener. STMT_BULK_EXECUTE is refused — clients need batch-rewriting disabled.
MongoDB	MongoDB wire (OP_MSG, hand-rolled)	:27018	DBB_LISTEN_MONGO	Clients authenticate with SCRAM-SHA-256 or PLAIN-over-TLS; upstream via SCRAM-SHA-256. Every command is classified, logged, and grant-checked.
Microsoft SQL Server	TDS (hand-rolled)	:1434	DBB_LISTEN_MSSQL	SQL authentication only (LOGIN7), TLS terminated at the proxy. SQLBatch and RPC are both enforced, not just logged. MARS and integrated/Entra ID auth are refused.

Any of these five can be reached through an SSH tunnel. Point a server's via_uid at an SSH bastion server and its upstream connection is dialled through that bastion — see SSH Tunnelling below.

The same auth + grant + query-logging pipeline runs across all five protocols, so:

• One user store (Argon2id passwords, roles, optional Slack OAuth) authenticates against any engine.
• One server catalogue holds target connections; a protocol field marks the engine.
• One grant model applies the same controls (read_only, block_copy, block_ddl) and quotas regardless of upstream engine.
• One query log records every statement (COM_QUERY, COM_STMT_EXECUTE, PostgreSQL Simple/Extended Query, Oracle TTC Execute, TDS SQLBatch/RPC) in the same queries table.
• One capture format records session traffic for any engine as standard pcapng — see the capture-format spec.

PostgreSQL

The reference implementation. Both authentication and command-phase traffic are inspected.

• Auth termination: clients authenticate against the DBBat user store; DBBat re-authenticates upstream using the encrypted credentials in the database catalogue.
• Read-only enforcement is layered:
  1. Regex SQL inspection blocks INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, MERGE, CREATE, ALTER, DROP, TRUNCATE, GRANT, REVOKE, COPY FROM, CALL.
  2. The proxy issues SET SESSION default_transaction_read_only = on at session start.
  3. Attempts to disable read-only (SET …, RESET, SET ROLE, SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION) are blocked.
• Result rows are captured up to query_storage.max_result_rows / max_result_bytes.

Oracle

Implemented as a hand-rolled TNS/TTC proxy in internal/proxy/oracle. See the full protocol notes for wire-level details.

• Connection routing uses the SERVICE_NAME from the TNS connect descriptor — match it against either the database name or its oracle_service_name.
• Auth: dbbat speaks O5LOGON to the client — any of the user's API keys works as the password (per-user O5LOGON salts; verifiers loaded from the user's API keys). The upstream session is re-authenticated using the database's stored credentials.
• Query extraction: SQL is parsed out of TTC Execute (function 0x03, sub-op 0x5e) packets; result rows are decoded for the first response (func=0x10) and continuation packets (func=0x06).
• Number/Date decoding: Oracle NUMBER and DATE formats are decoded for row capture.

Tested clients

Verified end-to-end (authenticate, query, and observability capture) against Oracle 23ai:

Client	Status
go-ora	Works — SQL, rows and bind values end-to-end
Python oracledb (thin)	Works — verifier 18453
SQLcl 26.1+ (ojdbc)	Works — classic O5LOGON, verifier 18453
sqlplus (OCI instant client)	Works — via the wide (4-byte) TTC encoding, no DISABLE_OOB needed
ojdbc11 / DBeaver	Connects, SQL logged; result-row capture partial

Row capture is best-effort: the TTC binary layout varies across client versions, so some clients or query shapes capture partial rows. SQL text extraction is reliable across all of them.

MySQL & MariaDB

Implemented in internal/proxy/mysql on top of go-mysql-org/go-mysql. See the full MySQL notes for protocol-level details.

• Auth termination: caching_sha2_password is advertised by default. The fast-auth scramble is intentionally unused — every login takes the full-auth path so the cleartext password can be verified against the Argon2id hash (over TLS or RSA-OAEP).
• TLS: terminated at the proxy. DBB_MYSQL_TLS_CERT_FILE / _KEY_FILE provide the cert; if empty, a self-signed cert and RSA-2048 keypair are generated at startup.
• mysql_clear_password: accepted as a fallback for clients that explicitly pin to it.
• mysql_native_password: not supported (Argon2id is one-way; we cannot derive the SHA1 nested hash).
• API key auth: a "password" prefixed with dbb_ is verified as an API key.

Always-blocked operations (regardless of grant)

Operation	Why
LOAD DATA INFILE	Reads files from the MySQL server filesystem
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE	Server can request the client to upload arbitrary local files. Refused at SQL level and via CLIENT_LOCAL_FILES capability opt-out on the upstream connection.
SELECT … INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE	Server-side filesystem write
COM_BINLOG_DUMP / COM_REGISTER_SLAVE	Replication protocol — would let a client tail the binlog
COM_SHUTDOWN / COM_PROCESS_KILL / COM_DEBUG	Privileged server operations
STMT_BULK_EXECUTE (MariaDB)	Not supported by go-mysql server side; refused

Logged commands

MySQL command	Logged as
COM_QUERY	SQL text
COM_STMT_PREPARE	PREPARE: <sql> (logged once at prepare time)
COM_STMT_EXECUTE	The previously-prepared SQL with parameters in parameters JSONB
COM_INIT_DB	USE <db> synthetic SQL
COM_PING, COM_QUIT, COM_STMT_RESET, COM_STMT_CLOSE	Not logged (housekeeping / keepalive noise)

Tested clients

Client	Library	Status
Go	go-sql-driver/mysql	Full coverage in CI
MySQL CLI	mysql 8.x	Manual smoke test
Python	PyMySQL	Manual smoke test
MariaDB CLI	mariadb 10.x	Manual smoke test

MongoDB

Implemented as a hand-rolled MongoDB wire proxy in internal/proxy/mongodb. See the full MongoDB notes for protocol-level details.

• Wire framing: OP_MSG (2013) with kind-0 command bodies and kind-1 document sequences, plus the legacy OP_QUERY/OP_REPLY used for the first hello. BSON encode/decode via go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/v2/bson. OP_COMPRESSED is accepted with zlib (capped at 64 KiB inflated before authentication); snappy/zstd are declined.
• Auth termination: two client mechanisms are terminated at the proxy:
  • SCRAM-SHA-256 (driver default) — DBBat runs the server side of SCRAM against a stored verifier in users.protocol_data.mongodb, so the cleartext password never crosses the wire (TLS optional). Verifiers exist only for passwords set after this shipped.
  • PLAIN-over-TLS (authMechanism=PLAIN) — the driver sends the cleartext password (hence the TLS requirement), verified via the same Argon2id path as the other proxies. dbb_ API keys work as the password.
• Upstream: DBBat authenticates to the target with SCRAM-SHA-256 using the decrypted stored credentials. The upstream authSource defaults to admin and is overridable per server via mongo_auth_source.
• Target-database resolution: Mongo has no pre-auth database field, so the SASL authSource carries the DBBat database name (or a dbbatuser#databasename username, or the user's single active MongoDB grant).

Microsoft SQL Server

Implemented as a hand-rolled TDS proxy in internal/proxy/mssql. See the full SQL Server notes for protocol-level details.

• Auth termination: SQL authentication only. The username and password come out of LOGIN7 and go through the same Argon2id path as the other proxies; a password prefixed with dbb_ is verified as an API key. The LOGIN7 Database field names the DBBat entry, not a database on the target. Refusals are returned as a proper TDS ERROR + DONE stream, so drivers surface the reason instead of a dropped socket.
• TLS: TDS encapsulates its TLS handshake inside TDS packets, so the proxy terminates it at the listener. DBB_MSSQL_TLS_CERT_FILE / _KEY_FILE provide the cert; if empty, a self-signed cert is generated at startup. DBB_MSSQL_TLS_DISABLE=true answers ENCRYPT_NOT_SUP and keeps the listener plaintext.
• Query interception: whole logical messages are classified before anything is forwarded. SQLBatch (text decoded from UCS-2LE) and RPC are both enforced, not merely logged — otherwise wrapping a write in sp_executesql would bypass read_only. Enforcement runs on the statement template; parameter values are captured for the query row.
• block_copy maps onto bulk copy: BULK INSERT, INSERT BULK and OPENROWSET(BULK …), plus the BulkLoadBCP message that streams the rows.
• Approval holds work here like everywhere else, and a client Attention cancels a parked statement.

Deliberately unsupported

Feature	Why
MARS (MultipleActiveResultSets=True)	Refused in PRELOGIN — it multiplexes independent request streams over one connection, which the interception pipeline is not built for.
Integrated authentication (NTLM / Kerberos / SSPI)	Refused with a message telling the user to connect with a SQL login.
Azure AD / Entra ID federated auth	Declined in PRELOGIN and refused again if the LOGIN7 FEATUREEXT block still carries a FEDAUTH request. DBBat can neither mint nor validate a federated token.
Changing a password through the proxy	Not supported.
TDS below 7.4 (pre SQL Server 2012)	The token forms DBBat emits are TDS 7.2+ wide forms; the floor is enforced at login.

Stored-procedure bodies are not visible to DBBat — it sees EXEC dbo.Something, not what it does — so such a call fails closed under a restrictive grant.

SSH Tunnelling

A target that is not directly reachable from DBBat can be dialled through an SSH bastion. This is transport-level and engine-agnostic: it works identically for PostgreSQL, Oracle, MySQL/MariaDB, MongoDB, and SQL Server.

• Bastion entries live in the same server catalogue, with protocol: ssh. They describe how to reach the bastion (host, port, SSH user, credentials) and nothing else — an SSH server is never itself a proxied target and can never be granted to a user. Managing them requires the admin role; they are also exposed under /api/v1/ssh-servers.
• via_uid on a database server points at such a bastion. When set, DBBat opens the upstream connection through the tunnel instead of dialling the target directly.
• Host-key pinning (TOFU): the host key presented on the first successful connection is pinned, and every later connection must match it. The pinned key is readable as ssh_known_host_key so it can be checked against the bastion's real fingerprint.
• Private keys and passphrases are write-only — settable through the API, never returned by a read.
• Pooled dialer: one SSH transport connection per bastion is shared across many proxied sessions, each session getting its own forwarded channel. The database connections carried inside stay 1:1 with client sessions.

Picking a Port

Default ports are chosen to avoid colliding with a co-located database server:

Service	Default port
PostgreSQL proxy	5433 (PostgreSQL itself usually binds 5432)
Oracle proxy	1522 (Oracle listener usually binds 1521)
MySQL/MariaDB proxy	3307 (MySQL/MariaDB usually bind 3306)
MongoDB proxy	27018 (MongoDB itself usually binds 27017)
SQL Server proxy	1434 (SQL Server itself usually binds 1433)
REST API + web UI	4200

Override any of them with the matching DBB_LISTEN_* environment variable.

5433 is also the conventional port for pgbouncer. On a host that already runs pgbouncer, set DBB_LISTEN_PG to a free port (e.g. :5434) to avoid a collision.

1434 looks like a collision with SQL Server and is not: the SQL Server Browser service that owns 1434 is UDP-only, so 1434/tcp is free even on a host already running SQL Server.